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INTRODUCTION
Envision a plaintiff who was injured on the job at a construction
site due to his employer’s negligence. The plaintiff has chronic back
pain, but it is not verifiable on an X-ray, nor is a physical injury readily
discernible by any other technology. Presently, fact finders are given the
broad discretion to decide whether they find this plaintiff credible, and
accordingly, whether they believe he is truly in pain and deserves dam
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ages for pain and suffering. However, neuroimaging—specifically functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)1—could allow those fact
finders to visualize whether this plaintiff was hurting by depicting the
unique signatures that are activated in the brain when the plaintiff experiences pain. Accordingly, the use of fMRI imaging would potentially
provide a more objective basis through which fact finders could decide
whether this plaintiff was legitimately suffering from chronic pain.
The price paid for pain and suffering in litigation is extraordinarily
high. Damage awards for injuries stemming from pain and suffering in
tort amount to billions of dollars per year.2 Disability benefits alone,
which are often awarded to those who suffer—or claim to suffer—
chronic pain, constitute over $100 billion annually.3
Nonpecuniary damages have historically been difficult to calculate.
In contrast to pecuniary damages, pain and suffering, emotional harms,
and damages stemming from “invisible injuries” often have no ceiling or
floor, and jury awards can range from massive sums to no award at all,
presumably based on the jury’s partiality and trust toward a particular
plaintiff.4 Because of the difficulty in affixing a monetary value to these
nonmonetary injuries, legislators and legal theorists over the years have
attempted to develop a more concrete method of calculating these damages.
State legislatures have experimented with statutes that limit nonpecuniary damage awards for particular causes of action with varying
success. Some states have statutes in place that cap nonpecuniary damages at a predefined value,5 while other states’ statutes use a combination
of a hard cap and formulas that take variables into account such as life
1. See infra Part I.B for a description of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and
other neuroimaging technologies.
2. Amanda Pustilnik, Exploring the Brain in Pain: An Applied Neuroscience & Law Initiative,
MASS. GEN. HOSP. CTR. FOR L. BRAIN & BEHAV. (Oct. 6, 2014), http://clbb.mgh.harvard.edu/
pustilnik-blog-1.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Paul DeCamp, Beyond State Farm: Due Process Constraints on Noneconomic
Compensatory Damages, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 231, 258–59 (2003) (arguing in part that fact
finders are given little guidance in assessing noneconomic compensatory damages and that “[t]he
fundamental problem at [the damage assessment] point in the process is that the jury has essentially
been asked to conjure a damages figure from thin air”).
5. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 893.55, 895.04 (2014) (limiting award of noneconomic damages in
medical liability cases to $750,000, indexed for inflation); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-302
(2015) (limiting award of noneconomic damages in medical liability cases to $250,000, and limiting
total award of damages to $1,000,000); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-19a02, 60-1903 (West, Westlaw
through 2015 Regular Sess.) (limiting noneconomic damages to $250,000 for causes of action accruing between July 1, 1988 and July 1, 2014; $300,000 for causes of action accruing between July 1,
2014 and July 1, 2018; $325,000 for causes of action accruing between July 1, 2018 and July 1,
2022; and $350,000 for causes of action accruing on or after July 1, 2022).
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expectancy and earnings.6 State courts have differed in their views as to
the constitutionality of damage-capping statutes. These statutes have
been challenged and upheld by some state courts,7 while others have
struck them down on constitutional grounds.8 Presently, there are as
many damage award structures as there are states, and it is clear that the
noneconomic damages system is in flux nationally. Unsurprisingly, legal
scholars have suggested a range of alternative damage award structures
on which states could base their statutory schemes.
Some legal scholars have proposed replacing the current pain and
suffering award system—a system that relies on broad jury discretion
and damage caps—with a “system of quantitative ‘scheduling’ of awards
for nonpecuniary loss.”9 Three alternative scheduling models have been
suggested.10 The first alternative is “a system of standardized awards set
according to a matrix of dollar values based on victim age and injury severity.”11 The second is “a scenario-based system that employs descriptions of prototypical injuries with corresponding award values designed
to be given to juries as guides to valuation.”12 The final alternative is “a
system of flexible ranges of award floors and caps that reflect the various
categories of injury severity.”13 Because these schedules can more comprehensively address the variability and predictability of problems in
damage awards, the proponents of these alternatives propose that a sys6. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010 (2014) (limiting noneconomic damages for personal
injury or wrongful death actions to “$400,000 or the injured person’s life expectancy in years multiplied by $8,000, whichever is greater[,]” subject to certain exceptions).
7. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098, 1121 (Kan. 2012) (upholding Kansas statute
capping noneconomic damages under a rational basis review, finding it “‘reasonably conceivable’
under the rational basis standard that imposing a limit on noneconomic damages furthers the objective of reducing and stabilizing insurance premiums by providing predictability and eliminating the
possibility of large noneconomic damages awards”).
8. See, e.g., Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 592 So. 2d 156, 170 (Ala. 1991) (invalidating
statute requiring $400,000 noneconomic damages cap on grounds that the statute “violates the principle of equal protection as guaranteed by §§ 1, 6, and 22 of the Constitution of Alabama”); State ex
rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1095 (Ohio 1999) (holding
statute that capped noneconomic damage awards in personal injury cases to $200,000 “invalid
on due process grounds because it is unreasonable and arbitrary, irrespective of whether it
bears a real and substantial relation to public health or welfare”); Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp.,
771 P.2d 711, 728, amended by 780 P.2d 260 (Wash. 1989) (invalidating Washington state
statute that limited the award of noneconomic damages for bodily injury to 43% of the average
annual wage multiplied by the plaintiff’s life expectancy on the grounds that the variable limit
on noneconomic damages awards violated the right to a trial by jury provided for by the Washington State Constitution).
9. Randall R. Bovbjerg, Frank A. Sloan & James F. Blumstein, Valuing Life and Limb in Tort:
Scheduling “Pain and Suffering,” 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 975 (1989).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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tem of matrices or scenarios is superior to the floors and caps system.14
Again, a floors and caps system enables broad jury discretion, which
might be avoided through matrices or scenarios.
Unfortunately, despite the fact that these alternatives are generally
well-accepted in the legal community, the system for awarding pain and
suffering damages has remained in a stagnant state—a system that relies
on the broad discretion of the jury. Thus, with nonpecuniary damages
award systems in a state of flux, it is reasonable to begin searching for
alternative models which might provide a more objective system of
measuring noneconomic injuries.
This Note discusses the pros, cons, and feasibility of a pain and suffering award system that incorporates neuroimaging evidence, where a
floors and caps system would be largely unnecessary and plaintiffs
would be able to collect the awards they deserve while still operating
within a system based on narrowed jury discretion. This Note argues
that, while holding promise for the near future, the current pain neuroimaging technology is not sufficiently reliable nor accepted in the scientific
community to warrant widespread use in litigation to prove pain and suffering injuries, and at present, courts are likely to exclude pain scans because of their prejudicial nature.
First, Part I provides a brief background of current structural and
functional neuroimaging technology and whether the technology can be
used to prove pain and suffering. Next, Part II discusses the evidentiary
hurdles for getting neuroimages admitted as evidence as seen in a wide
variety of cases where courts have admitted or denied neuroimaging evidence. Part III analyzes the potential uses of neuroimaging evidence in
proving pain and suffering and the implicit problems with its admission
into the courtroom. Finally, this Note ultimately concludes that because
the technology is not presently generally accepted in the scientific community as a verifiable method to prove pain, the judicial system is not
currently prepared for the broad-scale admission of neuroimaging evidence to prove pain and suffering.
I. BACKGROUND: AVAILABLE NEUROIMAGING TECHNOLOGY
Neuroimages are generated by computers, are produced from noninvasive techniques, and represent both the brain’s structure and function.15 The technology is relatively new.16 In order to understand why
14. Id.
15. See Elizabeth Haberfeld et al., Neuroimaging: Visualizing Brain Structure and Function,
CTR. FOR BIOETHICS AT COLUMBIA UNIV., http://ccnmtl.columbia.edu/projects/neuroethics/module1/
foundationtext/index.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
16. See id.
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neuroimages should not be admitted as evidence to prove pain and suffering at this stage, it is imperative to have a basic understanding of the
technology itself. This Part first provides background information on
structural and functional neuroimaging techniques. It then discusses the
structural regions of the brain believed to be implicated in pain perception and explains how the current technology may be used to prove pain
and suffering.
A. Structural Neuroimaging Technology
Two techniques are primarily used to generate structural neuroimages (images of the brain’s structure): computerized tomography
(CT) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI).17 MRIs are expensive and
produce a high-quality image, while CT scans are less expensive but of
lower quality.18 Additionally, MRIs take longer to capture and produce
an image.19
CT scans “measure the attenuation of X-ray beams passing through
target tissue,” or in other words, the scans produce black and white images that show the degree that different types of brain tissue absorb and
deflect X-ray beams, which provides a structural image.20 A subtype of
CT that is useful for showing how blood flows to particular regions of
the brain is the single positron emission CT (SPECT).21 A SPECT scan
integrates CT and also incorporates a radioactive tracer to view the brain
and body; the tracer allows clinicians to see how blood flows to tissues
and organs.22 CT scans are widely used in medicine and produce an accurate image of a particular patient’s brain structure.23
In MRI, “grayscale images are constructed from the electromagnetic signals that are emitted by the proton nuclei of hydrogen atoms, which
are found predominantly in tissue water.”24 In order to obtain MRI images, a person is placed in an MRI scanner, which has a strong external
magnetic field, and the nuclei in the patient’s brain tissue are pulsed with
radio frequency waves, producing a structural image.25 Like CT scans,

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Jeffery A. Coffman, Computed Tomography in Psychiatry, in BRAIN IMAGING: APPLICATIONS IN PSYCHIATRY 1, 5 (Nancy C. Andreasen ed., 1989).
21. SPECT (Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography) Scan, MAYFIELD BRAIN &
SPINE, http://www.mayfieldclinic.com/PE-SPECT.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
22. Id.
23. Coffman, supra note 20, at 1.
24. Jennifer Kulynych, Note, Psychiatric Neuroimaging Evidence: A High-Tech Crystal Ball?,
49 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1255 (1997).
25. Id.
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MRI is a reliable and common method of producing structural images of
the brain.26
Though MRI is the more expensive of the structural neuroimaging
techniques, it does offer advantages over CT.27 The first advantage is
that, unlike CT, in which multiple images should not be taken sequentially due to the risk of radiation exposure, MRI allows multiple scans to
gather images in rapid sequence with no risk of radiation overexposure.28 The second advantage is that MRI has vastly superior anatomical resolution for soft tissue structures, which is highly desirable in
all settings.29 Both of these technologies have traditionally been used to
show and prove physical injuries to the brain.
B. Functional Neuroimaging Technology
In contrast to the structural neuroimaging techniques described in
the previous subsection, functional neuroimages actually capture images
of the brain while in action.30 The two most prevalent functional neuroimaging techniques are positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).31
PET scans detect the spatial distribution of water molecules or glucose molecules within the brain, which are labeled with positron-emitting
radioisotopes.32 The radioisotope data from the PET scanner is then
computer-analyzed in order to determine the relative differences in metabolic rates across the structures of the brain.33 The resulting computergenerated image depicts metabolic rates through color gradations.34 From
these images, scientists can infer that the brain structures that have the
highest metabolic rates are those that are most involved and active in
responding to different stimuli—for example, pain.35
Conversely, fMRIs measure blood oxygenation levels within the
brain in order to determine which brain structures are being utilized

26. Id.
27. Nancy C. Andreasen, Introduction to BRAIN IMAGING: APPLICATIONS IN PSYCHIATRY,
supra note 20, at ix, x.
28. Nancy C. Andreasen, Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Imaging, in BRAIN IMAGING:
APPLICATIONS IN PSYCHIATRY, supra note 20, at 67, 68.
29. Id. at 68.
30. Henry H. Holcomb et al., Positron Emission Tomography: Measuring the Metabolic and
Neurochemical Characteristics of the Living Human Nervous System, in BRAIN IMAGING:
APPLICATIONS IN PSYCHIATRY, supra note 20, at 235, 236–37.
31. See generally Andreasen, supra note 27.
32. Holcomb, supra note 30, at 238.
33. Id. at 236–37.
34. See id. at 240–41.
35. See id. at 237.
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when a subject performs a cognitive activity.36 This technique measures
the change in the blood oxygenation level using a method called bloodoxygenation-level dependent contrast imaging, which is an index of metabolic activity and superimposes data onto a static, structural MRI image
of the brain.37 This process produces neuroimages with high resolution
and dynamic information about brain activity.38
Similarly to a PET scan, fMRI allows scientists to make inferences
based on the relationship between changes in brain structures and the
subject’s mental activity.39 Both of these technologies have widespread
clinical application. For example, researchers have used PET and fMRI
to pinpoint regions of the brain associated with the human perception of
pain,40 which is essential if these technologies are to be admitted as evidence of a litigant’s pain and suffering, or lack thereof.
C. Locating Structural Regions of the Brain Implicated in Pain
Perception with Presently Available Technology
These new neuroimaging techniques have allowed researchers to
discover structures of the brain that are responsible for pain perception
with rapidly increasing accuracy and understanding.41 The idea of pain
signals being conducted by a distinct class of neurons, or brain cells, was
first described in 1906.42 Since then, PET and fMRI have allowed researchers to hone in on specific areas of the brain that they believe are
responsible for the human experience of pain.43 Early studies of the brain
regions responsible for the pain experience were performed using PET
and quickly furthered our understanding of the brain’s role in the pain
sensation.44
PET studies have shown that large distributed brain networks were
activated during painful stimulation.45 Research indicates that the cortical
and subcortical regions—the brain regions consisting of the cortex and
regions below the cortex—that activate during pain stimulation include
the anterior cingulate cortex, insula, frontal cortices, primary somatosen-

36. Kulynych, supra note 24, at 1256.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Jonathan Brooks & Irene Tracey, From Nociception to Pain Perception: Imaging the Spinal and Supraspinal Pathways, 207 J. ANATOMY 19, 19 (2005).
41. See id.
42. See generally CHARLES S. SHERRINGTON, THE INTEGRATIVE ACTION OF THE NERVOUS
SYSTEM (Oxford Univ. Press 1906).
43. See Brooks & Tracey, supra note 40, at 20.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 22.
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sory cortex, second somatosensory cortex, and amygdala.46 This amalgam of brain structures has since been dubbed the “pain matrix.”47
The pain matrix is divided into medial and lateral pain systems.48
Although this is a simplified distinction of the involved neural networks,
it is a useful categorization because brain regions that appear to have
similar roles in pain perception are grouped together.49 The lateral pain
system, which consists of the primary and secondary somatosensory cortex (regions that are responsible for handling most sensory perceptions),
is thought to be primarily responsible for discerning the location and intensity of painful stimuli.50 Conversely, the anterior cingulate cortex is
believed to be involved in the cognitive-evaluative component—the experiential and analytical aspect of pain.51 Additionally, the insula is believed to encode both the intensity and the laterality (whether pain is on
the left or right side of the body) of both painful and nonpainful thermal
stimuli, as well as potentially having a role in affective pain processing,
which is the emotional response to pain.52 Accordingly, it is likely that
the insula is responsible for integrating information from both the medial
and lateral systems.53 Through pinpointing specific brain regions responsible for different aspects of the experience of pain, this data will allow
for litigants to prove what they are experiencing with more precision.
Using electroencephalography, which is not a neuroimaging technique but rather a method of measuring electrical activity in the brain,
our current understanding of the pain matrix and its processing of pain
has further improved.54 It is now believed that the frontal operculum,
which includes the secondary somatosensory cortex and insula, are very
strongly implicated in pain sensation.55 For example, these regions of the
brain are the only cortical regions found to produce a perception of pain
in response to direct electrical stimulation.56 The above group of brain
structures is not an exhaustive list of structures involved in pain perception, but illustrates that at this point, researchers have been able to locate
specific regions of the brain that allow humans to experience pain.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. M. C. Bushnell et al., Pain Perception: Is There a Role for Primary Somatosensory Cortex?, 96 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7705, 7705 (1999).
51. Pierre Rainville et al., Pain Affect Encoded in Human Anterior Cingulate but Not Somatosensory Cortex, 277 SCIENCE 968, 968 (1997).
52. Brooks & Tracey, supra note 40, at 23.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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Although it is clear that the current technology has allowed researchers to discover structures of the brain that are responsible for pain
perception, whether this is enough to prove pain and suffering in court is
more tenuous.
D. Using Neuroimaging Technology to Prove Pain and Suffering
Experts’ opinions on whether neuroimaging technology is reliable
and accurate enough for courtroom use are conflicting, but the reliability
of the technology has increased markedly in a very short period of time.57
For example, a neurologist and director of Stanford University’s Pain
Management Center testified as an expert in a workers’ compensation
case wherein an employee suffered chemical burns that he alleged left
him with chronic pain. The neurologist stated that he was “of the strong
opinion that in 2008, we cannot use fMRI to detect pain, and we should
not be using it in a legal setting.”58 Although the employee’s lawyers
assembled evidence that included an fMRI scan showing increased activity in the pain matrix of the brain, this neurologist, in testifying for the
defense, did not feel the technology and its use in assessing and showing
pain were reliable enough at that time.59
More recently, however, a greater body of research has developed
using fMRI to show pain.60 In 2013, for example, in four studies involving 114 participants, researchers developed an fMRI-based measure that
predicts pain intensity individualized to the particular participant (a “neurologic signature”).61 The results of their studies showed significant
promise for the use of fMRI in measuring pain.62 In two of the studies,
researchers found that the neurologic signature correlated pain sensitivity
and brain structures with the subjects’ ability to discriminate painful heat
from a simple sensation of warmth, and the subjects’ ability to anticipate
pain and recall pain.63 In the third study, the neurologic signature discriminated between physical pain and social pain, and in the last study,
the strength of the neurologic signature was “substantially reduced”
when an analgesic was administered.64 These results strongly indicate
57. See generally id.
58. Greg Miller, Brain Scans of Pain Raise Questions for the Law, 323 SCIENCE 195, 195
(2009), available at http://apkarianlab.northwestern.edu/media/ScncePainConf.pdf (quoting neurologist Sean Mackey).
59. Id.
60. Tor D. Wager et al., An fMRI-Based Neurologic Signature of Physical Pain, 368 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1388, 1388 (2013), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMoa1204471.
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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that it is possible to use fMRI to assess pain in healthy persons.65 The
problem is that many external factors affect an individual’s pain perception, and less is known about the individual’s neurologic signature in
response to chronic pain, which is often the injury claimed for pain and
suffering damages.
Preliminarily, sensitivity to pain varies significantly from one individual to another.66 Additionally, psychological factors including anxiety, attention, and distractions likely alter neurologic signatures in fMRI
scans.67 Anxiety and focusing on pain often increase pain; consequently,
they will strengthen the pain’s neurologic signature in fMRI scans.68 In
contrast, distraction from pain will often decrease the neurologic signature.69 Further, imagined pain often activates the same regions of the pain
matrix as real pain.70 This creates substantial problems when claiming
damages because plaintiffs with frivolous lawsuits who exaggerate their
pain could potentially exploit fMRI evidence to further their claims.
In contrast, based on current studies, other neuroscientists believe
that the time for fMRI pain evidence is nigh. One study found that activity in the medial prefrontal cortex and right insula correlated strongly
with the duration and intensity of chronic pain in individuals with chronic back pain.71 This sect of neuroscientists is optimistic that the fMRI
technique provides an “objective measure of pain in these patients.”72
Legal commentators following the development of the science believe
the legal sector may utilize the science even before the scientific community at large is satisfied with the technique. One law professor noted
that fMRI-pain researchers “care more about causation than we do in the
law,” and that “[i]f the correlation is high enough . . . we [in the law]
would see that as a useful tool.”73 Thus, even if researchers do not find
the near perfect correlation between pain stimuli and neurologic signature they strive for in their research, the technology might still enter the
courtroom because of trial judges’ discretion in the admission of scientific and expert evidence.
Because there are two schools of thought regarding the reliability of
fMRI and neuroimaging technology in accurately showing real pain,
whether neuroimaging evidence will be admitted will likely come down
65. See id.
66. Miller, supra note 58, at 195.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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to the credibility of the expert testifying on either side. Accordingly, attempting to have neuroimaging pain evidence admitted in litigation is not
an easy task at this point due to evidentiary standards.
II. EVIDENTIARY HURDLES IN ADMITTING NEUROIMAGING EVIDENCE
Although neuroimaging techniques have allowed us to somewhat
reliably visualize the sensation of pain, lawyers have encountered difficulty in getting neuroimages and expert testimony regarding neuroimages admitted into evidence. This Part provides an overview of the Frye
and Daubert standards for the admission of scientific evidence and examines whether neuroimages might be admitted under these standards by
analyzing cases where it has been attempted. Finally, this Part concludes
by explaining why Daubert jurisdictions are likely to be more amenable
to the admission of neuroimaging evidence.
The majority rule for admissibility of scientific evidence prior to
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) was the “general
acceptance” standard.74 This standard, known as the “Frye standard,”
requires any scientific evidence to be generally accepted in the scientific
community in order to be admitted into evidence.75 In Frye, the court
faced the decision of whether to admit the systolic blood pressure deception test; this test is based on the theory that truth is spontaneous and
comes without conscious effort, while the utterance of a falsehood requires a conscious effort that is resultantly reflected in an individual’s
blood pressure.76 The court held that this test did not have the requisite
recognition and general acceptance among psychological and physiological authorities necessary to justify admitting expert testimony on the
defendant’s behalf.77 Although the Frye standard is still used in some
states, the United States Supreme Court determined in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. that FRE 702 superseded Frye for claims
arising in federal courts.78
The Court in Daubert looked to United States v. Abel in determining whether common law evidence standards could still be relevant in the
new world of the Federal Rules of Evidence.79 Taking particular note of

74. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
75. Id. at 1014.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).
79. Id. at 588–89; see United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51–52 (1984) (“In principle, under
the Federal Rules no common law of evidence remains. ‘All relevant evidence is admissible, except
as otherwise provided . . . .’ In reality, of course, the body of common law knowledge continues to
exist, though in the somewhat altered form of a source of guidance in the exercise of delegated pow-
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FRE 402, which states in pertinent part, “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by
the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority,” the Court was faced
with a difficult decision due to the potential relevancy of scientific evidence inherent in many criminal and civil trials.80 The Court held that
FRE 702 speaks to the common law standard set forth in Frye.81
FRE 702, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, provides: If “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,” then “[a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify [thereto] in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.”82 Per Daubert, because FRE 702’s text does not
establish general acceptance as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility,
nor does anything in the Federal Rules of Evidence indicate that the
Rules as a whole were intended to incorporate a general acceptance
standard, the general acceptance standard should not be applied in federal trials.83
As a result, the Court held that general acceptance is not a precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence.84 The Court further held
that “the Rules of Evidence—especially Rule 702—[assigned] to the trial
judge the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand,” and that “[p]ertinent
evidence based on scientifically valid principles will satisfy those demands.”85 Additionally, the Court added several nonexclusive factors to
determine the reliability of the expert testimony, including whether the
technique has been tested, whether the technique has been subjected to
peer review and publication, the potential error rate in using the technique, the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation, and whether the technique has been generally accepted
in the scientific community.86 Thus, the Court concluded that the Federal
Rules of Evidence superseded Frye.87 The Daubert factor test has since

ers.”) (quoting Edward W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L.
REV. 908, 915 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588; FED. R. EVID. 402.
81. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
82. FED. R. EVID. 702.
83. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588–89.
84. Id. at 597.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 593–94.
87. Id. at 597.
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replaced the Frye general acceptance standard in determining the admissibility of scientific evidence in federal courts.88
Regardless of whether a court applies the Frye or Daubert standard,
it is difficult to predict whether a given court will admit neuroimaging
evidence to prove pain and suffering due to the relative novelty of using
the technology in this way and the paucity of case law on point. However, courts’ responses to neuroimaging evidence to prove different injuries, as well as decisions regarding its admissibility in lie detection, may
prove instructive.
A. Admissibility Under Frye’s General Acceptance Standard
Although the Court in Daubert held that FRE 702 superseded the
Frye standard for federal trials, the general acceptance standard is still
used in a fairly large number of state courts.89
For example, a New York state court expressly refused to apply the
Daubert factor test, even at the request of the defendant, and instead applied the general acceptance standard to the use of a PET scan expert in a
personal injury case.90 After the plaintiff had offered an expert’s testimony in order to support her allegation that she suffered minor brain trauma
when a piece of her bathroom ceiling collapsed on her head, the defendant filed a motion attempting to exclude the expert’s testimony, asserting
that the use of PET scans to diagnose brain injury is not generally accepted in the medical field.91 The trial judge found that the PET scan satisfied the general acceptance standard and denied the defendant’s motion, allowing the jury to hear the expert’s testimony with regard to the
PET scan results.92
Conversely, in State v. Smith, a Maryland trial judge refused to allow fMRI evidence in a criminal case under the Frye standard.93 The
judge in this case was faced with the decision of whether to admit fMRI
scans as evidence that the defendant was telling the truth—a modern
neurological polygraph test.94 Here, the defendant submitted testimony
88. See id.
89. Id. at 594; see FED. R. EVID. 702 Advisory Committee Notes. See generally Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in
State Courts, 90 A.L.R. 5th 453 (2001) (discussing state cases in which courts have applied Daubert,
Frye, or some other test in determining the admissibility of expert testimony regarding scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge).
90. Brown v. Allerton Assocs., No. 17917/03, 2006 WL 3102331, at *1–3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct.
5, 2006).
91. Id. at *1–2.
92. Id. at *1, 3.
93. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, State v. Smith (Md. Cir. Ct. Oct. 3, 2012) (No.
106589C), available at http://www.lawneuro.org/_resources/pdf/fMRIOpinion.pdf.
94. Id. at 1.
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and research articles in support of his request to admit the results of the
fMRI that was conducted on him.95 The defendant argued that “the fMRI
methodology used for lie detection and truth verification is generally accepted in its relevant scientific community, as shown through the ‘totality of published scientific literature on the topic.’”96 Although the defendant presented twenty-five peer-reviewed scientific journal articles on the
fMRI lie detection and truth verification method, the court was “not
swayed by that number when considering the depth of scientific analysis
done in a particular area[,]”97 implying that because other areas of science have a greater body of research, twenty-five articles was insufficient. Further, though none of the submitted articles concluded that the
technology does not work, the court was “not persuaded that the fact that
there is no evidence a scientific method does ‘not work’ is evidence that
it is reliable and valid.”98 Importantly, and instructive for future litigants,
the court noted that “the standard required for admissibility in a court of
law is higher than the method simply not working.”99 The court further
noted that “[t]here must be evidence of the method’s reliability and validity as determined by its general acceptance in the relevant scientific
community,” and that the “tepid approval of a few scholars through
twenty-five journal articles does not persuade this Court that such acceptance exists.”100
Thus, as these cases illustrate, although the Frye standard requires
general acceptance in the scientific community, the admissibility of evidence still largely comes down to the broad discretion of the judge as to
what exactly constitutes general acceptance. Smith in particular illustrates the resistance to admitting unfamiliar scientific evidence such as
fMRI into the courtroom. Although every journal article brought to the
court indicated that the method was reliable, the court still refused to
admit the evidence because the judge simply did not feel that twenty-five
scholarly articles was sufficient.101
What, then is needed in order to achieve general acceptance? The
answer is impossible to predict because it depends on the fortification of
each judge’s scientific evidence gate. FMRI evidence of pain and suffering is unlikely to fare any differently. Indeed, the problem with the Frye
standard is that it “exclude[s] cutting-edge scientific evidence that might
be [1] both relevant and reliable under traditional legal standards but
95. Id. at 4.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See id.
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[2] [i]s not yet widely accepted by scientists.”102 The Daubert standard,
however, may prove friendlier to this type of evidence due to its distancing from the general acceptance standard.
B. Admissibility Under the Daubert Standard and the Federal Rules of
Evidence
Under the Daubert standard, neuroimaging evidence has been similarly met with skepticism. In United States v. Semrau, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals was faced with the decision of whether to affirm or
reverse a trial court evidentiary decision similar to that of the Maryland
trial judge in Smith.103 As in Smith, the lower court in Semrau refused to
admit expert testimony regarding fMRI truth verification testing in its
Daubert hearing.104 The Semrau court affirmed the trial court’s exclusion
of this evidence in affirming the defendant’s conviction for healthcare
fraud.105 The court reasoned in part that, pursuant to FRE 403,106 the
fMRI evidence’s probative value was substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial nature.107 In a footnote, the court stated, “[t]he prospect of
introducing fMRI lie detection results into criminal trials is undoubtedly
intriguing and, perhaps, a little scary.”108 Again, this illustrates courts’
reluctance to accept newfangled neuroimaging evidence. Because the
Daubert admissibility formulation is dependent on an individual judge’s
discretion, it is difficult to predict whether a particular court applying the
Daubert standard will allow evidence of this type into its courtroom.
In contrast to Semrau, in In re Welding Fume Products Liability
Litigation, the Federal Northern District of Ohio in its Daubert hearing
admitted several of the defendant’s neuroscientific experts’ testimonies
to rebut the plaintiff’s claim that their manganese fumes caused neuro-

102. 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 6266, at 265 (1997).
103. United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012).
104. Id. at 531.
105. Id.
106. FRE 403 provides “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 403.
107. Semrau, 693 F.3d at 524. Specifically, the court held “that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in excluding the fMRI evidence pursuant to FRE 403 in light of (1) the questions surrounding the reliability of fMRI lie detection tests in general and as performed on Dr. Semrau,
(2) the failure to give the prosecution an opportunity to participate in the testing, and (3) the test
result’s inability to corroborate Dr. Semrau’s answers as to the particular offenses for which he was
charged.” Id.
108. Id. at 524 n.12.
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logical injuries.109 The defendant’s evidence, which included MRI and
PET scans, allegedly established that there was no causal link between
manganese and the claimed neurological injuries.110 In reliance on their
evidence, the defendant filed a motion to exclude all testimony that refuted their experts’ interpretations of the neurological scans.111 The court
denied the motion, reasoning that although the defendant’s evidence was
convincing, it could not prove dispositively the causation or lack thereof.112
Because admissibility is left solely to the discretion of the judge—
the “gatekeeper” of evidence—it is less relevant whether the submitted
methodology is generally accepted in the community and more relevant
that the methodology proves accurate. Thus, it seems that neuroimaging
evidence may more easily enter the courtroom under the Daubert standard.
III. POTENTIAL FUTURE USE
Because most of the cases in which courts admit neuroimaging evidence are unreported, the gap in the legal community’s knowledge of
how to use this evidence, and whether they even can use this evidence, is
growing instead of shrinking. This Part first examines two cases in which
neuroimaging evidence was admitted, and then moves on to describe the
uses and problems with the use of neuroimaging evidence in civil litigation.
A. Two Promising Cases Using SPECT and fMRI
Although there is a notable gap in reported cases, one of the first
reported cases in which neuroimaging evidence was admitted was a
Ninth Circuit case, Boyd v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Players Retirement Plan.113 This case illustrates the problems that plaintiffs face in attempting to gain disability benefits for nontraditional physical injuries,
and the potential assistance that neuroimaging evidence can provide. In
Boyd, many of the plaintiff’s symptoms, such as headaches and fatigue,
were not physically manifested.114
This rather well-known case centered on one of the first suits
brought against the National Football Association for degenerative disa109. See In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:03-CV-17000, 2005 WL 1868046, at
*31 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 2005). This is the trial court’s Daubert hearing order. The case was later
reported as In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 2d 775 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
110. Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 2005 WL 1868046, at *31.
111. Id.
112. Id. at *30–31.
113. Boyd v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Players Ret. Plan, 410 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2005).
114. Id. at 1175.
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bility benefits under the Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle National Football League
Player Retirement Plan (the Plan).115 The Plan provides disability, retirement, and other benefits to eligible current and former National Football League (NFL) players.116 The plaintiff, Brent Boyd, was an offensive lineman for the Minnesota Vikings from 1980 to 1987.117 In 2000,
Boyd filed his second application for football degenerative disability
benefits under the Plan, claiming benefits based on alleged organic brain
problems resulting from head trauma.118 His symptoms included “a general constant flu-like feeling, fatigue, headaches, queasiness, forgetfulness, intermittent blurred vision, difficulty reading, lack of concentration,
learning difficulty, memory loss, dizziness and light-headedness.”119 The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the NFL on the
grounds that the plaintiff could not prove his alleged brain injuries.120
The physician for the Plan concluded from his examination that the
plaintiff “[did] appear to have several problems that may arise out of
head injuries suffered in the course of his NFL career.”121 At Boyd’s request, a second physician conducted a SPECT scan122 on Boyd, and the
scan revealed decreased brain activity consistent with head trauma.123
This evidence was admitted into court under the federal Daubert standard, as interpreted by an expert.124 The results of the SPECT were referred to another physician whose medical conclusions were admitted
into court.125 Unfortunately for Boyd, this physician concluded that
“[b]ased on the evidence available, the alleged head injury of August,
1980 could not be organically responsible for all or even a major portion
of the neurologic and/or neuropsychologic problems that Mr. Boyd is
experiencing now, to a reasonable degree of medical probability[,]” and
this “include[d] the allegedly abnormal SPECT scan results in this category.”126
Although in Boyd’s case the neuroscientific evidence worked
against him, in future cases this type of evidence may help plaintiffs with
similar injuries, and in all likelihood, will even be used by current and
115. Id. at 1174.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1175.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1174.
121. Id. at 1176.
122. See supra Part I.A.
123. Boyd, 410 F.3d at 1177.
124. Id. This is generally the way neuroscientific evidence is admitted into the courtroom due
to the potential for the images to mislead the jury if admitted without an expert’s explanation.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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former NFL players to collect football degenerative benefits for brain
injuries sustained during their time in the league.
In contrast, the plaintiff in Koch v. Western Emulsions Inc. was able
to benefit from the admission of fMRI evidence to prove his pain.127 Carl
Koch sued his former employer, Western Emulsions, for damages arising
out of a 2005 work incident which resulted in Koch burning his wrist
with molten asphalt.128 When the suit was filed in 2006, Koch still allegedly had chronic pain in his wrist.129 In order to prove the pain, he had an
fMRI performed on him at the fMRI Research Center at Columbia University.130 The neuroscientist at the Research Center believed she had
developed a method that would allow her to visualize chronic pain via
fMRI.131 When she lightly touched Koch’s injured wrist, the stimulus
provoked a signal in the pain matrix, while lightly touching the other unaffected wrist did not.132 The neuroscientist performing the test stated
that this methodology “is a well-characterized way to distinguish allodynia—a pain response to a stimulus that does not normally cause pain—
from imagined pain.”133 The case unsurprisingly turned into a battle of
the experts.134
At trial, the defendants called a neurologist of their own to the stand
who testified that pain is too subjective to measure in this way, and that
the signal seen on the scan could be produced by imagining the pain or
concentrating on it.135 In the end, the trial judge admitted the scan, which
contributed to the case settling for $800,000, a sum that, according to
Koch’s lawyer, was over ten times the defendant’s initial settlement offer.136 Armed with an fMRI scan allegedly corroborating his claims of
wrist pain, Koch was able to gain a more favorable settlement offer and
settle before the conclusion of the trial.137 Thus, the trial court judge’s
discretion in admitting the neuroimaging evidence was instrumental to
the final disposition of the case.

127. Sara Reardon, Neuroscience in Court: The Painful Truth, 518 NATURE 474, 475 (2015).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See id.
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B. Future Uses and Problems with Use in Civil Litigation
Irrespective of whether a court applies the Frye or Daubert standard, it is clear that given the current schism in the scientific community
as to its reliability and accuracy, as well as the corresponding potential
prejudice that might be wrought upon its admission, courts are presently
resistant to admitting neuroimaging evidence. However, the persistent
development of pain-detecting neuroimaging will lead to increasing demand for these scans and an increasing number of litigants moving to
admit neuroimaging evidence into court. Similarly, the continually advancing technology and its growing acceptance in the scientific community will inevitably increase the courts’ confidence in admitting this evidence. But as the admission of neuroimaging evidence becomes more
common, new issues will arise.
Plaintiffs and defendants alike will increasingly gravitate toward
the use of this evidence, whether the technology is reliable or not. The
human tendency is to give greater weight to evidence we can see with
our own eyes. Indeed, for many, seeing is believing. Regardless of
whether the scans are accurate and reliable, fact finders may tend to
place trust in the scans simply because they will be impressed by the colorful images of the subject’s brain and because the scans intuitively seem
like objective science. Accordingly, litigants will likely secure neuroimaging scans in attempts to support or defend against claims of pain and
suffering on the chance that the trial judge will admit the scan into evidence. Although in some cases, like Boyd, the evidence may actually
have a detrimental effect, many will likely move to admit the evidence
anyway; the battle of the experts always brings with it a gamble. It is
thus fair to predict that as this technology develops further, litigants’ use
of favorable pain scans will almost undoubtedly become correspondingly
common due to the hope that the neuroimaging evidence will sway the
minds of the fact finders in the litigants’ direction. Regardless of the frequency with which litigants move to admit this evidence, however,
courts should remain wary to admit it.
Neuroimaging evidence of pain and suffering—particularly fMRI—
is approaching the level of reliability necessary for use in a courtroom,
and it may be that it enters the courtroom with relative regularity within
the next decade. It is clear that researchers have made drastic strides in
discovering and assessing the brain’s pain matrix.138 As this research becomes more accepted, judges using the Frye standard will be more likely
to admit it under the general acceptance standard. Likewise, courts using
the Daubert standard will be more apt to accept the evidence with the
138. See supra Part I.C.
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comfort that the body of research surrounding neuroimaging and pain is
growing. A scientific method’s general acceptance in the scientific community seems to bear an inverse relationship to courts’ fear of prejudice
wrought by the admission of that evidence. Thus, as the body of research
grows, courts’ acceptance will correspondingly increase.
At present, however, the scientific community is divided as to the
validity of pain neuroimaging technology.139 Until the greater scientific
community supports the methodology and neuroimaging scans can provide a truly objective framework for limiting the broad discretion of the
fact finder in awarding pain and suffering damages, courts will be—and
should be—wary to admit neuroimaging scans.
CONCLUSION
There is no simplified or expedited path that will fast track the admittance of neuroimaging evidence of pain and suffering into the courtroom. FMRI pain scans, though close to general acceptance, still do not
produce the requisite level of certainty to make them useful in the courtroom. For injuries that lack physical proof, a plaintiff’s word will still
carry overwhelming weight in fact finders’ determination of pain and
suffering awards.
Courts are understandably uncomfortable with accepting unproven
technology to prove questions of fact. Although the method has developed and increased in reliability and use in the last two decades, at this
point it is not an agreed-upon valid method to show pain, and judges
have little precedent to rely on in admitting the scans as evidence. It will
take bold judges like the judge in Koch to allow this evidence to bolster
claims of pain and suffering. But as the technology becomes more reliable and generally accepted, the question we must all ask ourselves is
whether we want a human fact finder or a machine deciding whether we
are in pain.

139. See supra Part I.D.

